This paper deals with a model of economic growth, which we expand to include endogenous policy switching based on retrospective voting. It is shown that under certain conditions the solution has a special form that we call a cyclically balanced growth path. This type of solution is an analogue to balanced growth paths, which often occur in growth models with constant policies. Cyclically balanced growth paths are investigated analytically, and the growth rate over the cycle has been found. Results of numerical experiments are also provided and possible empirical applications of the model are outlined.
Introduction
Policy change occurs in a discrete manner: tax rates, electoral rules, tariffs, trade regulations change discontinuously at certain moments in time. Discrete policy changes are essential to political life per se (though they are more natural in democracies, where policy switching is built into the basic mechanism, namely the change of power through elections). However, political science and political economy usually do not focus on policy change. One possible reason for this may be that the mainstream formal paradigm of studying policy choice issues-game theory-seeks equilibrium policy solutions which maximize individual utility or common social benefits ( [Aiyagari et al. 2002] , [Bassetto 2014 ], [Battaglini and Coate 2007] ). As a consequence, rational choice models focus on a single (optimal or not) policy ([Andre et al. 2010 ], [Hassler et al. 2005] ). This approach ignores the real-life variety of both actual policies and opinions on policy issues. Moreover, this approach yields policies chosen "once and for all"
(even in dynamic environments [Battaglini et al. 2012] , [Devereux and Wen 1998 ]). Sometimes policy changes are allowed in a probabilistic manner; in this case they are usually linked to the chances of the incumbent losing office ( [Angelopoulos and Economides 2008] , [Malley et al. 2007] ). These exogenously defined probabilities affect the equilibrium solution, but they do not produce actual policy change. Consequently, the real-life phenomenon of a social system with regular policy switching stays out of focus.
For this reason, in the present work we eschew the game-theory approach in favour of a dynamic model with endogenously-defined policy switching. The switching mechanism is based on economic retrospective voting [Anderson 2007 ], [Healy and Malhotra 2013] , if private capital has declined between elections, the public votes for the challenger, which leads to policy change.
Otherwise, the public supports the incumbent, and the policy remains the same.
More formally, the model's main expressions are dynamic discrete time equations formulated for economic variables (such as private capital, state budget). The equations contain the governing parameter (tax rate) which is used as a proxy for the economic policy of the party currently in office. Elections take place at set time intervals corresponding to electoral cycles (each interval is considered a single time period). Two parties vie for office, with the results being defined by economic retrospective voting: the incumbent party loses if the results of its policy have led to diminished private capital in the latest electoral cycle. The incumbent losing the elections brings about a change in policy, e.g. if the system was governed by Party 1 and the private capital has decreased, then at the next interval of time it will be governed by Party 2.
However, if private capital has increased (or remained the same), then there is no change in power, and the system remains governed by Party 1.
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We focus on regimes with cyclically changing parties in office. Let such regimes be denoted e.g. 122122122…. The latter notation means that in the first time interval the office was held by Party 1, then by Party 2 at the second and third time intervals, again by the Party 1 at the forth time interval, and so on. The cyclical switching of power may be accompanied either by non-negative economic growth over the cycle or by decline.
We show that in this dynamical system with endogenous switching, an analogue to a balanced growth path appears. A balanced growth path is a solution which has all of its components increase or diminish proportionally over any time interval, either exponentially (in continuous-time models) or geometrically (in discrete-time models). Such solutions exist in many models of economic growth with constant policies.
In our model with endogenous policy switching all components of the solution increase (or decrease) in the same proportion over the political cycle (not over any interval of time). We refer to these solutions as cyclically balanced growth paths.
Let us also note that depending on the starting point and parameter values, the system may have solutions of a different type, such as regimes with no policy change after a transition period, e.g. 12222222222…
Another important issue which the current model allows us to touch upon is the difference between short-term and long-term policy effects. Given the economic retrospective behaviour of voters, the public might vote for short-term benefits rather than long-term ones. A long-term growth policy might lead to short-term economic decline, with the party who carries out such a policy losing office after its first term in power. This in turn may lead to the public temporarily supporting long-term decline (but short-term rise) policy, with the party that proposes long-term decline policy remaining in power for additional terms.
The model under consideration is close to the model presented in [Akhremenko and Petrov 2014] , but instead of the Cobb-Douglas production function we use the Leontief production function. The main advantage of the Leontief form is that it opens more opportunities for analytical research. Therefore, in contrast with the previous work, the solutions are studied analytically as well as quantitatively.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is an overview of the model itself.
Section 3 contains an analysis of the model given a constant tax rate, i.e. there are no elections (we call it an autocracy), which allows us to define long-term growth and decline policies.
Section 4 explains how a party carrying out a long-term growth policy may lose office as a result of retrospective economic voting, while a party with a long-term decline policy may stay in office in the short-term. Section 5 considers cyclically balanced growth paths.
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Model
The model uses the Leontief production function
Gt is public capital, b is a technologically determined constant, A>0 is a time-invariant total factor productivity parameter. Two points are of note considering our production function choice.
The first point refers to the production factor choice. Traditionally, two-factor production functions use labour and capital. Historically, the choice of public and private capital as production factors in economic growth models seems to have been made only by [Arrow and Kurz 1969] . However, in recent literature public capital is becoming an increasingly popular subject of research focus ( [Arslanalp et al. 2010] , [Aschauer 2000 ], [Gupta et al. 2014] , [Pritchett 2000] ). This may be due to growing interest in the interaction between state policy (including tax policy) and economic development.
The second point considers the production function specification. Econometric research focuses mainly on Cobb-Douglas functions, while theoretical works tend to use CES functions that generalize many other production functions and, given a set of parameters, can be reduced to, for example, Cobb-Douglas, Leontief, linear functions. Leontief production function as a standalone form is used more rarely. Our choice of Leontief PF is due to a technical consideration: while the solutions that are the focus of the current work (cyclically-balanced growth paths) may numerically be observed using other production functions, the Leontief function is better suited for analytical solutions. Note that as both production factors are kinds of capital and Leontief function is uniform ( We will now proceed to construction of the model.
The output Y(t) is taxed at a fixed rate  , tax revenue fills the state budget T(t), so
The whole budget T is invested into public capital, adjusted for investment efficiency γ (which may be empirically measured as the Public Investment Management Index (PIMI)  [Pritchett 2000] ). Taking into consideration the depreciation rate  , public capital dynamics take the form        
Private capital at t+1 is the remnant of the previous period's output after taxes have been
Thus, the discrete time model is expressed as:
Here  is the switching parameter. For every t either  
which party is currently in office. Initially Party 1 (that is Party
Retrospective economic voting occurs at
and is expressed as:
Reducing (1)- (5) to a system of two equations gives us:
This is the model that is subject to analysis.
The next section is auxiliary, devoted to systems with no endogenous switching (following the [Akhremenko and Petrov 2014] terminology, autocratic regimes), i.e. the system (9)- (10) with constant  . This will allow us to introduce certain notions concerning party policies within the system.
In Section 5, the policies defined will be used to analyse two-party systems in which cyclically balanced growth paths may occur. 
Long-run growth policies and long-run decline policies
The current section considers a model with no switching of policies. We will demonstrate that the policy  may be defined as long-run growth or long-run decline depending on the long-term consequences of its application to the system.
In addition, we base the definitions of the high-tax policy and the low-tax policy on the following consideration. In (1)- (5) vice versa for the low-tax policy.
Note that this holds true for any production function form, yet with a Leontief function this effect is the most prominent.
Consider system (9)- (10) with constant  . Balanced growth path is defined as follows:
If 0 a  , we say that the system is growing in the long-run and refer to solution (11) and the solution's parameter  as a long-term growth regime and long-term growth policy, respectively. If 0 a  , the system has a long-run decline.
We also call it long-run decline if both components of the solution (not necessarily taking the form (11)) tend to zero (
Let us represent the results for a constant policy system (9)- (10) 
Proving Theorems 1 and 2 is quite straightforward, based on direct substitution of (11) into the equations (9)- (10). We omit the proof due to triviality. Theorem 2 allows us to define the high-tax and low-tax policies. Let  be a low-tax policy if
And a high-tax policy if
Theorems 1 and 2 are illustrated in Fig.1 . 
Long-run and short-run dynamics
The previous section was concerned with long-term effects of various policies. However, the short-term effects may drastically differ from the long-term ones, for example with certain starting conditions a long-run growth policy may lead to a short-term decline, and vice-versa. Therefore, with economic retrospective voting a party conducting a long-run growth policy may lose office after its first term in power without actually seeing the positive results of its policy. In contrast, a long-run decline party may stay in office for several terms. 
Cyclically balanced growth paths
In what follows, we assume that / Ab  , i.e. long-run growth policies exist. Sections 3 and 4 were auxiliary and considered a system with no switching of policies, i.e. governed by a single policy chosen "once and for all". We now proceed to analyse systems with endogenous switching of policies. Let us consider several cases.
Two low-tax policies
The current section considers (7)-(10) in the case of two low-tax policies, with Party 1's policy being long-run growth and Party 2's policy being long-run decline. Therefore,
12 Let us first prove an auxiliary Lemma. 
Part one. Let
    K t bG t 
. Then equations (9)- (10) take the form
Using inequality (15), we get from (16):
This can be reduced to
. It follows that there is some constant
Let us prove that     K t bG t  for some t. Equations (9)- (10) for
Using the inequality (15), from (18) after simplifications we get:
. (19) Substituting (17) into (19) , after simplifications we get:
Let us denote the expression on the right-hand part of above inequality as
14 As the sequence 
This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
The economic meaning of Lemma 1 shows that after a certain point in time a low-tax policy (i.e. if the inequality (15) holds true) leads to private capital being the abundant production factor and public capital being the deficient production factor.
Let us proceed to system (9)- (10) with endogenous switching (7)- (8) Then equations (9)- (10) for 0 tt  take the form:
Voting rule (7)- (8) takes the form
If       
In order to get the election outcome at 0 2 tt , let us calculate the growth of private capital:
It follows from (14) that For the next point in time we have:
 losing office. Therefore, at the next moment the system is governed by
For the change in private capital we have: Thus, we get a political cycle 1221221… . It is easily shown from (20)- (21) and (25)-(30) that the growth rate over the cycle is given by
for any integer 0 tt  . If (31) is greater than 1, it means economic growth, otherwise it means economic decline.
This sub-section's results may be summarized by Theorem 3.
Theorem 3.
Let
and let inequalities (14) hold true. Then,
, then system (7)- (10) show the trajectory of a long-run declining system. 
Long-run growth high-tax policy and long-run decline low-tax policy
The current section considers model (7)- (10) for rivalry between the long-run growth high-tax policy of Party 1, and the long-run decline low-tax policy of Party 2. Thus:
for some t. Then the solution of (9)- (10) satisfies    
Proof. The system (9)-(10) takes the form 
The application of Lemma 2 yields
Let us consider the elections at 
Combining (40) and (41), we obtain the necessary condition for the cyclically balanced growth path:
Provided (42) After some simplifications it can be proved that
Therefore, equations (9), (10) 
Depending on     
